Key Takeaways
Computer science researchers developed and tested a device that, if plugged into a hardwired communications channel connecting two key flight computers, can take over communications between these computers.
The proof-of-concept attack suggests that physical access to an aircraft’s computer bay under the nose of the plane is a cybersecurity risk that should be considered.
Physical access to an aircraft has not typically been considered a cybersecurity risk – but it should be, according to a team of computer scientists at the University of California San Diego. In a paper presented Aug. 13 at the USENIX Security Symposium in Baltimore, Md, former UC San Diego PhD student Sam Crow showed that physical access to an aircraft – even for a brief period of time – would allow an attacker equipped with a custom-made hardware device to take over the communications between two key onboard computers.
The device needs to be plugged into a port inside the plane’s belly – an action that the researchers estimate would take under 60 seconds. This would require access to the aircraft either when parked at a gate or when in an airport hangar during regular maintenance. Access to these areas is controlled carefully but not always successfully, the computer scientists note in the new paper.
The researchers successfully demonstrated the attack on a testbed made of actual Boeing 737 airplane parts and airplane software. The proof-of-concept attack allowed researchers to change the plane’s flight path and change data that could make takeoff conditions unsafe. But they are careful to note that the attack requires someone to do significant planning and engineering work ahead of time. The research team communicated closely with Boeing, disclosed the vulnerability in 2020, and further tested and validated their findings in Boeing’s own lab.